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Аннотация: Несмотря на то, что добыча углеводородов в бассейне Каспийского моря не 
является приоритетом для Ирана, Тегеран придает особое значение укреплению экономи-
ческого сотрудничества с прибрежными государствами. Иран, который долгое время не 
принимал участия в формировании региональной повестке дня, выдвигает инициативы, 
способные обозначить новые подходы к региональному развитию по самому широкому 
кругу вопросов, включая добычу и транспортировку углеводородных ресурсов. Так, к 
примеру, недавние события наглядно продемонстрировали, что иранские власти отчет-
ливо осознают, что энергетическая отрасль все еще является определяющим фактором 
при определении экономических и внешнеполитических приоритетов для прикаспийских 
государств, экономика которых остается экспортно-ориентированной. В результате Иран 
начал подготавливать почву для совместной разработки морских месторождений Каспия 
и возобновления операций по нефтяным свопам. Исходя из этого, основной целью статьи 
является рассмотрение политики Ирана в отношении Каспийского региона, делая особый 
акцент на энергетической стратегии Тегерана в Каспийском бассейне, а также уделяя осо-
бое внимание как перспективам развития морских месторождений, так и энергетическому 
сотрудничеству с прибрежными государствами.
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Abstract: Despite the fact that the production of hydrocarbons in the Caspian Sea basin is not a 
priority for Iran, Tehran attaches special importance to strengthening economic cooperation with 
the littoral states. Iran, which was out of a regional discourse for a long time, comes up with 
initiatives that can shape new approaches towards the regional development in a broad array of 
issues, including extraction and transportation of hydrocarbon resources. For instance, recent 
developments have shown that the Iranian authorities clearly acknowledge that the energy factor 
still has a prevailing influence on both the shaping and implementation of economic and foreign 
priorities of the Caspian states, the economy of which remains export-oriented. As a result, Iran 
started to prepare the ground for the joint development of the Caspian offshore deposits and 
resuming oil swap operations. 
Therefore, the main purpose of the paper is to consider Iran’s policy toward the Caspian region 
highlighting Tehran’s energy strategy towards the Caspian basin and focusing on the exploration 
activities and prospects of development of offshore fields, as well as energy cooperation with 
littoral states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that the production of hy-
drocarbons in the Caspian Sea basin is not a 
priority for Iran, Tehran attaches special im-
portance to strengthening economic coopera-
tion with the littoral states. In fact, the recent 
developments in Iran’s foreign policy towards 
the neighboring Caspian states, especially Rus-
sia, together with a gradual process of emerg-
ing from international isolation after signing 
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPA) also known as Iran nuclear deal, indi-
cates strong intention of Tehran to improve its 
involvement in addressing regional challenges 
as an influential regional policymaker.
It is quite understandable that Iran, which 
is the second largest economy in the Middle 
East and North Africa region after Saudi Ara-
bia, with an estimated gross domestic product 
(GDP) in 2017 of $439.5 billion (Iran wit-
nessed an increase in its GDP by $20.6 billion 
in 2017 compared to figures in 2016 where 
GDP amounted to $418.9 billion. Moreover, in 
2015 Iran’s GDP amounted to $385.8 billion, 
which was a $48.6 billion decrease comparing 
with 2014), still depends to a large extent on 
oil revenues. Therefore, the development of 
Проблемы постсоветского пространства / Post-Soviet Issues
151
Лидия А. Пархомчик, «Последние изменения 
в каспийской энергетической стратегии Ирана в Каспийском регионе»
2018 5(2):149-160
its Caspian provinces, economy of which is 
characterized by the agriculture sector, is not 
considered as a real priority. Current statistics 
show that due to a significant rise in oil produc-
tion and exports the Iranian economy strongly 
recovered in 2016-2017. For instance, follow-
ing the removal of nuclear-related internation-
al sanctions, oil and gas production increased 
by 62%, which made it possible to increase the 
annual growth rate to 13.4% in 2016 compared 
to 1.3% in 2015 and to 4.3% in 2017 as oil 
production stabilizes. However, unemploy-
ment remains high and non-oil sector activity 
remains subdued. [1] In fact, in 2017 the num-
ber of employed persons in Iran reached an all-
time high of 23.8 million out of 80.9 million 
of the total population. On the other hand, the 
unemployment in Iran remains at double-digit 
rates, namely, more than 12%, with extremely 
high youth unemployment rate, which reached 
an all-time high of 30.4% in 2016 [2].
As a result, the main priorities of the gov-
ernment of Hassan Rouhani reelected for a 
second presidential term in May 2017 encom-
pass market-based reforms focusing on both 
strengthening economic ties with key trade 
partners and ensuring an increase in the flows 
of the foreign investments. It is expected that 
these measures would provide high economic 
growth rates, which will allow reducing social 
and economic pressures in the country. In fact, 
the relief of international economic sanctions 
allowed for the enhanced implementation of 
industrial and infrastructural projects within 
the country. In recent years, Tehran managed 
to fulfil a number of projects that significantly 
intense the industrialization in agricultural ar-
eas, including the Caspian littoral provinces. 
Indeed, recently discovered oil and gas fields 
in the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea has 
greatly increased the demand for highly devel-
oped coastal infrastructure oriented on trans-
portation and processing of hydrocarbons. 
Moreover, the Caspian provinces are of signif-
icant importance to Iran’s transportation strat-
egy as parts of the International North-South 
Transport Corridor (INSTC) aimed to ensure 
a multi-mode network of ship, rail, and road 
routes for moving goods between India, Iran, 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. 
It appears that Iran, which was out of a re-
gional discourse for a long time, comes up 
with initiatives that can shape new approaches 
towards the regional development in a broad 
array of issues, including extraction and trans-
portation of hydrocarbon resources. For in-
stance, recent developments have shown that 
the Iranian authorities clearly acknowledge 
that the energy factor still has a prevailing in-
fluence on both the shaping and implementa-
tion of economic and foreign priorities of the 
Caspian states, the economy of which remains 
export-oriented. As a result, Iran started to pre-
pare the ground for the joint development of 
the Caspian offshore deposits and resuming oil 
swap operations. 
Therefore, the main purpose of the paper is 
to consider Iran’s policy toward the Caspian 
region highlighting Tehran’s energy strategy 
towards the Caspian basin and focusing on the 
exploration activities and prospects of devel-
opment of offshore fields, as well as energy 
cooperation with littoral states.
EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFSHORE FIELDS
Being an oil export based economy, which 
focuses on the development of oil and gas 
bearing areas originating in the Persian Gulf 
and the Gulf of Oman, Iran pays less atten-
tion to the Caspian region, where there is still 
much work to be done to develop sustainable 
exploration and production of oil and gas. In 
fact, the country is a latecomer in conducting 
exploration activities in the Caspian region. 
The first offshore hydrocarbon deposit in the 
Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea was discov-
ered by Khazar Exploration and Production 
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Co. (KEPCO) (KEPCO is a subdivision of 
the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
founded in 1998. KEPCO is an authority in 
exploration, development and production of 
oil and gas in Iran concerning the Caspian Sea 
and three littoral provinces of Mazandaran, 
Golestan and Gilan. KEPCO supervises all 
the contracts signed by local and international 
companies regarding exploration and devel-
opment of hydrocarbon reserves in the area) 
in 2011. The Sardar-e Jangal field is located 
at Block 6.2, about 250 kilometers from the 
coastline of the Mazandaran province, 750 
meters below water surface. According to 
initial projections of the Iranian Ministry of 
Petroleum, the field contains total proven re-
serves of around 50 trillion cubic feet of nat-
ural gas (However, recent estimates from the 
operator of the field, KEPCO, placed reserves 
at 5 trillion cubic feet) (over 1,4 trillion cubic 
meters), which is ten times more than those 
of the Shah Deniz gas field, and about 10 
billion barrels of oil. In 2012, an oil layer in 
Sardar-e Jangal field was discovered, namely, 
the Sardar-e Milli deposit, which is estimated 
to hold two billion barrels of oil with a recov-
ery rate of 25%, or 500 million barrels. Ac-
cording to then Petroleum Minister Rostam 
Qasemi, the field contains light crude with 
zero sulphur content (API 39). It is expected 
that drilling 24 wells in the Sardar-e-Jangal 
oil field would allow a daily production of 
95,000 barrels, while drilling 32 wells would 
result in 120,000 barrels a day [3].
It is worth noting that in 2001 Tehran took 
the first steps to ensure the realization of the 
exploration activities in the Caspian Sea and 
the adjacent provinces of Mazandaran, Go-
lestan and Gilan following the geological and 
geophysical studies prepared by the South 
Caspian Study Group (SCSG) (In 1999-2000, 
Shell, Lasmo and Veba Oil teamed up to es-
tablish the SCSG aimed to conduct studies 
in the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea. 22 
months the group conducted 10,000 kilome-
ters of 2D seismic operations, reviewed data 
related to 26 wells drilled in Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan and compared the connection 
between the formations in the wells drilled in 
these two countries and Iran. In the end, the 
study discovered 86 geological structures in 
the Caspian Sea with 46 of them in better con-
ditions. Eight of them were picked as priori-
ty structures for exploration and production 
studies). Right after the well-known military 
incident with BP in the Azerbaijani sector of 
the Caspian Sea (The survey vessel of BP, 
which was the exploration operator of the 
Alborz/Araz-Alov-Sharg block, was moved 
out from the contract area by the Iranian mil-
itary motor boat in the summer of 2001) the 
Iranian Company SADRA started, under the 
Swiss company GVA’s license, to construct a 
semisubmersible platform designed for drill-
ing at the disputable Alborz block, which the 
Azerbaijani side calls Araz-Alov-Sharg (The 
drilling operation control system at the plat-
form technically belongs to the Norwegian 
company Maritime Hydraulic, which held 
trainings for the Iranian oil workers). How-
ever, a month after the First Caspian Summit 
held in Ashgabat in April 2002, Baku and 
Tehran officially declared that exploration 
works at the disputed offshore hydrocarbon 
fields would be stopped until resolving the 
border issue. As a result, the platform was 
used to conduct drilling operations on one of 
the eight priority structures selected under the 
SCSG study.
The official ceremony of the commission-
ing of the Alborz platform, which was then 
renamed as Amir-Kabir, took place in the 
summer of 2009 [4]. The platform started 
an exploratory drilling in February 2010. In 
fact, it was Iran’s first experience of deep 
water drilling. The domestically manufac-
tured semisubmersible drilling rig operated 
by 120 persons, is capable of drilling wells 
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down to 6,000 meters, but only usable for un-
derwater exploration works at a 1000-meter 
depth and cannot be used for gas or oil ex-
traction. The platform has so far drilled two 
exploration wells. The first well drilled at a 
depth of 2,460 meters in the Caspian Sea led 
to the discovery of the Sardar-e Jangal field 
(For comparison, Russia’s Yuri Korchagin 
oil field located at a depth of 3,500 meters, 
Azerbaijan’s Azer-Chirag-Guneshli fields – 
at depths ranging from 3,500 to 4,000 me-
ters, Kazakhstan’s Kashagan oil field – at a 
depth of 4,700 meters, while Azerbaijan’s 
Shah Deniz, which is the closest field to the 
Sardar-e Jangal, was discovered at a depth of 
more than 7,000 meters). In November 2014, 
the production tests, including pressure and 
temperature data recording, were carried out 
successfully in the second well, drilling of 
which finished after reaching a depth of 3,488 
meters. The second well drilled 1,423 meters 
away from the first well was later proven to 
contain oil. In 2015, KEPCO spudded the 
third exploratory well on the Sardar-e-Jangal 
field in the Caspian Sea. 
In order to maintain the 14,700-ton drilling 
rig (4,500 tons of the total weight belong to 
the technical equipment), which is fixed to 
the seabed by eight anchors weighing 20 tons 
each, KEPCO constructed three multipurpose 
auxiliary tugs named Caspian-1, Caspian-2, 
and Caspian-3, and established a base for the 
performance of oil operations in the northern 
Iranian city of Roudsar. KEPCO completed 
its drilling fleet by adding a relief and rescue 
vessel, two multi-purpose vessels, two pollu-
tion-removing vessels and a speed vessel.
The Iranian authorities strongly insist 
that Sardar-e-Jangal is the only indisputa-
ble oil and gas field discovered by KEPCO 
in the Caspian Sea. However, since the Sar-
dar-e-Jangal field is located approximately 
180 kilometers to the north-west from Astara 
and 194 kilometers to the south-west from 
the Azerbaijani Oil Rocks field (Fig. 1), it 
appears that this gas and oil deposit is situ-
ated to the north from the Astara-Hasangulu 
line, which was accepted as the boundary 
line separating the former Soviet Union and 
Iran [5]. In fact, according to the Azerbaijani 
authorities, areas to the north from the As-
tara-Hasangulu line are under the jurisdiction 
of Baku as they are located in the Azerbaijani 
sector of the Caspian Sea. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Sardar-e-Jangal field might 
legally belong fully to Azerbaijan or be sub-
ject to shared ownership. However, the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and the 
Azeri state-owned oil company SOCAR does 
not rush to claim rights to the offshore de-
posit. Indeed, despite the fact that according 
to a modified median line division method of 
the Caspian seabed, which was adopted by 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and, partial-
ly, Turkmenistan, this block is located in the 
Azerbaijani sector, there is still a possibility 
that after the completion of the geological ex-
ploration of the field it may gain a cross-bor-
der status just like the Iranian South Pars field 
in the Persian Gulf.
Figure 1. Iran’s Sardar-e Jangal gas and oil field 
Source: IranOilGas
Проблемы постсоветского пространства / Post-Soviet Issues
154
Экономические отношения
2018 5(2):149-160
ENERGY COOPERATION WITH LITTORAL 
STATES
Three-fourths of Iran’s reserves lie within 
its national borders, but the country shares 28 
oil and gas fields with the neighboring coun-
tries. These joint fields contain 20% of Iran’s 
oil reserves and 30% of its natural gas [6]. 
In fact, the volume of production of Iran’s 
neighbors from the joint oil and gas fields is 
currently nine times higher than that of Teh-
ran. Therefore, there is a possibility that Iran 
would consider the option of jointly develop-
ing disputable Caspian oil and gas fields. For 
instance, speaking at the meeting with Azer-
baijani President Ilham Aliyev held on the 
sidelines of the Iran-Russia-Azerbaijan sum-
mit in Tehran on November 1, 2017, Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani stated that Iran was 
ready to cooperate with Azerbaijan in various 
industrial sectors including oil and gas swap 
and exploration activities in the Caspian Sea 
region. Moreover, on September 28, 2017, at 
the invitation of Rovnag Abdullayev, head of 
Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, a delegation from KEP-
CO headed by Mohsen Delaviz, the compa-
ny’s managing director, held talks in Baku on 
the issue of joint exploration and development 
of Caspian Sea oil and gas fields. In fact, the 
parties already signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding (MoU) on cooperation in the oil 
and gas industry in 2016 (The document was 
signed between the NIOC and SOCAR during 
the visit of President Ilham Aliyev to Tehran 
in February 2016). It is worth mentioning that 
Iran considers both Azerbaijan and Russia as 
energy partners in offshore oil exploration in 
the Caspian basin. For instance, on October 3, 
2017, the Russian oil company Lukoil signed 
two preliminary agreements with the NOIC to 
study the Caspian Sea’s oil and gas potential 
(The agreements were signed in Moscow dur-
ing the 19th ministerial meeting of the Gas Ex-
porting Countries Forum). The agreement for 
a geological survey in the Caspian Sea coupled 
with a MoU signed between Lukoil and KEP-
CO paved the way for Russia’s second-largest 
oil producer to further cement its position in 
Iran’s petroleum market. Thus, it would be the 
first time for Iran and Russia to cooperate over 
an energy-related project in the Caspian Sea.
However, while recognizing the significance 
of energy talks between Iran and other litto-
ral states, it is important to note that recently 
signed agreements mainly demonstrate Iran’s 
desire, not full readiness, to launch energy co-
operation in the Caspian Sea in the near future. 
It is obvious that Tehran has not yet made a 
groundbreaking move that could contribute to 
joint exploration activities in the region. Nev-
ertheless, due to the fact that oil and gas devel-
opment in the Caspian Sea is totally different 
from that in the Persian Gulf, there is a need 
for attracting international oil companies pos-
sessing modern deep water drilling technolo-
gies as operators of Caspian energy projects. 
Since Iran’s capacity for further development 
of Caspian Sea resources is rather limited, in 
2015, KEPCO introduced four energy pro-
jects (Two out of four are exploration projects, 
while the remaining two focus on production 
and development of the fields) in the Caspian 
basin to potential investors, namely, Blocks 24, 
26 and 29 (Block 24 and 29 are located 130-
135 kilometers to the north from the Nowshahr 
port at a depth of 600-800 meters, while Block 
26 is situated 100 kilometers to the north-east 
from the Anzali port at a depth of 850-900 me-
ters), as well as the Sardar-e Jangal oil field, 
under Iran’s new model of oil contracts known 
as an integrated petroleum contract (IPC). In 
the following two years, Norway’s Offshore 
Resource Group (ORG) signed a MoU with 
KEPCO to study the development of all four 
projects (The agreement was signed by Jostein 
Kaare Kjerstad, ORG’s executive director, and 
Mohsen Delaviz, KEPCO’s managing direc-
tor, in Tehran on November 1, 2017). Thus, 
Iran managed to find an international energy 
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company possessing special equipment and 
experience to extract oil and gas from deep 
waters. It is probable that ORG’s exploration 
activity would be conducted by means of the 
second semisubmersible drilling platform, the 
construction of which is provided for in the 
agreement signed by KEPCO in 2013.
It appears that despite the fact that the 
groundwork has been laid by Tehran for the 
IPC-based development of the Sardar-e Jangal 
oilfield the commercial production of oil and 
gas there is still a matter of the distant future. 
According to Iranian Petroleum Minister Bijan 
Zangeneh, oil production in the Caspian Sea 
is not a priority for Iran. Such an approach of 
the Petroleum Ministry is entirely appropriate, 
given that Iran lacks cost-efficient technologies 
of deep water drilling. As Zangeneh has rightly 
pointed out, extraction of oil and gas from the 
Caspian deposits requires high technology and 
large-scale investment, therefore, it is on the 
agenda, but in the long-run perspective.
It could be concluded that a key goal of 
Iran’s energy strategy in the region is mainly 
to conduct exploration activities. In fact, Iran 
still does not have the necessary infrastructure 
to commence the commercial oil and gas pro-
duction. KEPCO has neither a pipeline nor a 
floating production storage and offloading 
vessel in the Caspian Sea to carry oil from the 
fields to the shore. Moreover, the fact that the 
ORG agreed to carry out exploration research 
does not guarantee that the European energy 
company will agree to operate at the disput-
able field, unless Tehran and Baku reach an 
agreement on the issue. As a result, as of to-
day the development of the Caspian fields is 
largely motivated by geopolitical rather than 
economic considerations. However, it is no 
doubt that the development of the Sardar-e 
Jangal and Sardar-e Milli fields could open a 
new chapter in hydrocarbon production in the 
Caspian Sea.
OIL SWAPS
Bordering the Persian Gulf and Gulf of 
Oman in the south, Iran could be a transit 
route for moving energy from the Caspian Sea, 
which has no direct access to the international 
waters and the world markets. In fact, oil and 
gas swap operations started in 2000 enabled 
Iran to hold a position of one of the leading 
Figure 2. Share of Iran in total regional export/import
Sources: UNCOMTRADE, International Monetary Fund, 2015
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importers in the Caspian region. Until 2010, 
the oil swap operations represented the lion’s 
share of Iran’s mutual trade with the regional 
countries, which resulted in a constant increase 
of Iran’s share in the total regional import from 
9% in 1996 to its highest rate of 23% in 2004. 
The average share of Iran in regional import 
has remained stable totaling 21% from 2003 
to 2010. However, after 2010 when the former 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad decided to 
halt swap operations, Iran’s share in the total 
regional import averaged 11% from 2011 un-
til 2016, reaching a record low of 6% in 2013 
(Fig. 2). As a result, the Iranian side is oriented 
at resuming oil swaps with the Caspian Five. 
According to reports, Iran swapped more 
than 254 million barrels of oil from 2000 to 
2010 generating $880 million in revenues. 
Under the agreement, Iran received crude oil 
from the Caspian states in Neka Oil Terminal 
where facilities with infrastructure relevant 
for oil swap and loading procedure are located 
(Neka Oil Terminal was built in 2003 in order 
to handle oil imports under swap agreements 
with the Caspian states). The Iran’s northern 
refineries processed oil swapped with further 
distribution of the oil products across the Cas-
pian provinces. Meanwhile, Iran delivered an 
equivalent volume of crude oil in its Persian 
Gulf terminals to the credit of its Caspian 
neighbors. The operations were conducted 
by the Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), 
which is a Swiss-based subsidiary of the NIOC 
that handles swap operations on behalf of the 
parent company. The parties considered the oil 
swaps as a win-win deal given that the Iranian 
side did not have to pay for transportation of 
the crude oil across the country from its south-
ern fields, while the Caspian states did not face 
the cost of transporting their hydrocarbons to a 
coastal terminal. However, in 2010 the Iranian 
government declared its intention to increase 
the fee that Iran charges its northern neighbors 
for its service from $1 to $5-$6 for each barrel 
of oil swapped. Unfortunately, the higher fee 
Iran wanted to charge made the swap opera-
tions unprofitable [7]. Moreover, the situation 
had been worsened by the inclusion of the 
NICO in the U.S. blacklist, which meant that 
direct trade, even by non-US companies, with 
NICO would lead to penalties. 
Nevertheless, since 2012 Iran tried to re-
vive the swap deals by preparing proposals 
to its Caspian neighbors on the resumption 
of oil swap operations. For instance, in 2016, 
Mahmoud Astaneh, Board Member of NICO, 
stated that Iran is fully ready for a daily swap 
of around 300,000 barrels of oil at Neka Oil 
Terminal as all required domestic preparations 
are completed and necessary negotiations with 
foreign counterparts are underway As a result, 
in August 2017, oil and gas explorer Dragon 
Oil shipped a cargo of oil produced from an 
offshore development in Turkmenistan to Iran. 
The Russian-flagged oil tanker discharged 
around 6,000 tons of crude oil at the terminal 
in the Caspian port of Neka. Moreover, in No-
vember 2017, Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Nam-
dar Zanganeh reported that Iran and Russia’s 
Energy Ministry have signed a contract for the 
supply of Iranian oil to global markets through 
the Russian ministry’s body Promsyreimport. 
The first tanker was already sent in mid-No-
vember under the agreement. It is planned 
that in 2018, Russia will purchase from Iran 
about 5 million tons of oil contributing to 
the resumption of swap operations (Jalilov 
O. Iran, Russia Sign deal on sale of Iranian 
oil to global markets. 2017 Retrieved from 
https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-rus-
sia-sign-deal-on-sale-of-iranian-oil-to-global-
markets-2017-11-30-41/).
In December 2017, Pirouz Mousavi, Man-
aging Director of the Iranian Oil Terminals 
Company (IOTC), reported that the IOTC 
handled 1.8 million barrels of crude oil since 
swap operations were resumed in August 
2017. The swapped oil was shipped from 
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Turkmenistan to refineries in Tabriz and 
Tehran in more than 36 cargoes, while the 
equivalent amount was delivered to buyers 
on Kharg Island (Data on Iranian crude oil 
swaps with Caspian states revealed. Iran Daily. 
2017. Retrieved from http://www.iran-daily.
com/News/206051.html?catid=3&title=Da-
ta-on-Iranian-crude-oil-swaps-with-Caspi-
an-states-revealed). In fact, there is a possibil-
ity to increase oil swap capacity between Iran 
and Caspian states in the medium term given 
that Neka Oil Terminal currently receives only 
around 50,000 barrels of oil per day. 
ELECTRICITY 
Nowadays, Iran’s electricity industry ranks 
14th in the world and first in the Middle East 
in terms of power generation. In June 2017, 
the country’s overall nominal capacity has 
reached 76,947 megawatts (MW). Iran is now 
exporting around 12 billion kilowatt-hours of 
electricity to its neighbors each year, while 
imports stand at an annual level of 4 billion 
kilowatt-hours. Iran imports 1.2% of its elec-
tricity consumption in order to keep the sea-
sonal balance. For instance, Iran experiences 
peak consumption in the summer, while in 
Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia electricity is 
consumed most in the winter. Under these con-
ditions, it is understandable that Tehran seeks 
opportunities to swap electricity in order to 
avoid costs related to the construction of new 
power plants. 
In fact, Iran views the South Caucasus as a 
potential area for energy trade and transporta-
tion [8]. In order to meet Nakhchivan’s energy 
demand, Azerbaijan started to buy electricity 
from Iran in late 1994. Before the construction 
of the 220-kilowatt Astara (Azerbaijan) – As-
tara (Iran) transmission line in 2003, over 60% 
of Nakhichevan’s electricity supply came from 
Iran via the 132- kilowatt Imishly-Parsabad 
power line, as well as two related 154-kilowatt 
transmission lines. In order to enable Iran to 
increase electricity supplies to Azerbaijan’s 
exclave, in 2006 the parties agreed to a mutual 
exchange of electricity during alternating peak 
consumption seasons. According to the agree-
ment, Azerbaijan was supposed to transfer 
power to Iran during the summer, providing 
electricity to the Iranian cities of Astara and 
Talesh, and receive power from Iran through 
the same line during winter. As part of the 
project, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an agree-
ment on the construction of a new high-volt-
age 330-kilowatt power line connected to the 
main Azerbaijani grid parallel to the existing 
132-kilowatt Imishli-Parsabad line. However, 
due to the international sanctions against Iran, 
the joint project has been suspended until 2016. 
In December 2016, the 330-kilowatt Mugan 
(former Imishli-Parsabad 2) power line was 
put into operation, and the framework agree-
ment was signed on the sale of electricity. In 
addition, in February 2016, the two neighbors 
concluded an agreement envisaging the con-
struction and operation of new hydro plants 
at the Khoda Afarin and Qiz Qalasi dams and 
hydroelectric complexes on the Araz River. 
The hydroelectric power plants and hydroe-
lectric complexes will be used by Baku and 
Tehran on equal terms. The construction of the 
hydropower plants will be implemented near 
the Araz River borderline in the Iranian town 
Marazad and the Azerbaijani city of Ordubad.
On the sidelines of the Trilateral Summit of 
the presidents of Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia 
held in Tehran on November 1, 2017, Ilham 
Aliyev, Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin 
agreed on enhancing cooperation in the oil and 
gas industry and electricity trade. In a joint 
statement issued following the talks, the par-
ties have expressed interest in supporting the 
implementation of the agreements on electric-
ity trade, as well as the project to connect the 
electricity grids of the three countries. There-
fore, it can be easily seen that Iran intends to 
create a regional electric power market with 
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its partners in the region. On June 6, 2013, 
the parties signed an agreement on measures 
aimed to ensure parallel operation of their 
energy systems confirming their intentions to 
establish common policies for modernization 
and development of the energy system. More-
over, Russian officials confirmed their inten-
tions to revitalize the project of establishing 
energy networks of Azerbaijan, Russia and 
Iran. Actually, the initial agreement was inked 
in Tehran in December 2004. The parties even 
formed a tripartite committee responsible for 
solving technical issues on the way of ensur-
ing the parallel operation of energy systems. 
Nevertheless, reaching of the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action, which has ensured the 
suspension of the nuclear program of Iran and 
the lifting of the sanctions, provided Azerbai-
jan, Russia and Iran with an opportunity to re-
sume the process of interconnection of energy 
systems.
In fact, Tehran is also interested to create 
conditions for effective parallel activities of 
the power grids of Iran, Georgia, Armenia and 
Russia. At the moment, a coordination group at 
the level of deputy ministers of the four coun-
tries is actively working to launch the projects. 
It is expected that by late 2019 the 1000 MW 
North-South Energy Corridor will operate at 
full capacity. Indeed, in December 2015, the 
Energy Ministers of Armenia, Georgia, and 
Iran, namely, Yervand Zakharyan Kakha Kala-
dze and Hamid Chitchian, respectively, as well 
as Chief Executive of the Rosseti, which man-
ages Russia’s power distribution grids, Oleg 
Budargin signed a memorandum on coopera-
tion in the energy sphere. Under the document, 
the parties agreed to cooperate in studying 
technical and legal framework for the possible 
synchronous operation of the four countries’ 
electricity grids. Currently, it is technically 
possible to synchronize the Armenian and Ira-
nian grids, on the one hand, and the Georgian 
and Russian grids, on the other [9]. As a result, 
in order to allow the single synchronization of 
all four countries’ electricity grids, there is a 
need to construct 400- kilowatt Iran-Arme-
nia and Armenia-Georgia power transmission 
lines (Electricity exchange capacity between 
Armenia and Georgia will reach 350 MW, 
with a further planned increase to 700 MW 
by 2021; exchange capacity between Armenia 
and Iran will reach 1200 MW). 
It should be noted that Iran’s SUNIR com-
pany has already received the official permit 
to build a 400-kilowatt Iran-Armenia power 
transmission line, the memorandum on con-
struction of which was signed between Arme-
nia and Iran in May 2006. In fact, the construc-
tion was repeatedly postponed due to a number 
of reasons, including Western sanctions against 
Iran. However, in August 2015 Ali Salehabadi, 
Managing Director of the Export Develop-
ment Bank of Iran (EDBI) (According to the 
agreement, the EDBI will provide 77% of the 
construction cost of the project, with the re-
maining 23% will be provided by the general 
contractor, namely, SUNIR. The total cost of 
the project is €107.9 million), and Aram Ana-
nian, Managing Director of Armenia’s High 
Voltage Electricity Network, signed the agree-
ment on the construction of the third power line 
between the two countries. The project of the 
400- kilowatt Meghri-Hrazdan power trans-
mission line with the total length of 279 kilom-
eters also includes construction of a 440-kilo-
watt substation 10 kilometers away from the 
Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant (Avanesov 
A. Iran-Armenia 400 kWt high-voltage line 
construction will finish on September 1 2018. 
2017. Retrieved from http://finport.am/full_
news.php?id=29486&lang=3). 
It could be concluded that most of Iran’s 
electricity trade with its partners is on an ex-
change basis, which makes it possible to syn-
chronize the power grids of the regional coun-
tries. It appears that the parties will continue 
efforts to ensure parallel operation of their 
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energy systems confirming their intentions to 
establish common policies for the moderniza-
tion and development of these systems. More-
over, the projected Armenia-Iran and Arme-
nia-Georgia power transmission lines are to be 
commissioned in 2019 will enable electricity 
transits and seasonal mutual supplies and ex-
changes between Iran and the countries of the 
Caspian-Caucasus region.
CONCLUSIONS
Although Tehran has not yet developed a 
clear framework for cooperation with the Cas-
pian littoral states there is no doubt that Iran 
is in the process of establishing the Caspian 
direction of its economic strategy. Indeed, 
Tehran’s current program of action is geared 
towards improving the lives of the Iranian cit-
izens through economic policies and measures 
focusing on the enhancement of the welfare of 
the population and full-scale revitalization of 
the national economy. As a result, the ongoing 
and completed projects aimed at the socio-eco-
nomic development of the Caspian littoral 
provinces are the constituent components of 
the long-term national development strategy 
that is intended to ensure economic growth. 
In fact, the economic importance of the Cas-
pian region for Iran will definitely increase if 
the country starts offshore oil production in the 
Caspian Sea. This would entail a greater focus 
on the development of the Caspian ports fa-
cilities and railway infrastructure. Otherwise, 
it is highly unlikely that Tehran will prioritize 
the northern ports’ capacity enlargement over 
the southern ports’ development since Iran still 
has a developing oil export based economy, 
which is demanding for direct access to inter-
national sea communication originating from 
the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Therefore, 
addressing the issue of the disputed oil and gas 
fields would be in the best interests of Tehran, 
which would positively influence the develop-
ment of friendly relations with Azerbaijan. 
As a result, it could be concluded that Iran 
is still in the early stages of institutionalizing 
its relationships with the Caspian Five. Tehran 
is trying to determine the best options for en-
suring its national interests in the Caspian ba-
sin and building trustworthy environment for 
bilateral cooperation with the littoral states. 
Stressing the region’s role as a bridge between 
the Middle East and Europe, the Iranian au-
thorities identify the necessity to realize its full 
economic potential. However, given that Iran 
has not yet developed a detailed strategy to-
wards the region implementing mainly a num-
ber of separate projects rather than as a coor-
dinated development program, it is becoming 
obvious that Tehran will continue building on 
its comparative advantages in future priori-
ty-setting. 
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